An analysis of the Welfare Reforms of 1996
Introduction
The policy in question with respect to this analysis is related to welfare, a critic favorite in the Obama administration. The legislation in consideration is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996 which was enacted under the Clinton administration. The reform came through at a time when legislation actually encouraged state welfare systems to increase their caseloads resulting in increasing government dependency. The early 90s was an era of American socialist reform when the unemployed Americans were engaged in the urge to abandon government dependency and find jobs to support themselves and their families. While Americans sought to become independent, the government realized the rift in American thinking and took steps to encourage this surge of citizens to seek work and responsibility. Thus, the then president Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996 in his quest to assist and change the way of thinking of Americans in need of financial assistance by limiting the budget for individual States, giving them more autonomy in making decisions with regards to restrictions of eligibility, and urging the employers to hire from the class of welfare dependent citizens.
The 1996 reform replaced the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children program which had been around since 1935 and essentially gave the state agencies an incentive to increase welfare caseloads since doing so would mean that they would get a corresponding increase in federal funds whereas a decrease in caseloads would result in a similar decrease in funds. This lure extended the welfare services to as many as 1 in every 7 children (Rector Bradley, 2009). Not only was this a great incentive for immigration, but also resulted in a rise in taxation. Before the reform America was engulfed in a system of welfare that was riddled with loopholes leading to frauds causing the Republicans to mandate plans to dismantle it (Hays, 2004). The country seemed to have given rise to generations of slackers leading to a culture of poverty (Zuckerman, 2000). Thus, Clinton sought to put an end to this system and on August 22 1996, signed what was to be a revolutionary changeover for the system of welfare amidst incredible criticism.
The goals of his policy were simple. He aimed at moving the existing number of dependent low-income or unemployed individuals to seek work in order to be able to support themselves better while at the same time reducing the burden on the State and consequently on the federal budget. The AFDCs funding structure was the primary reason the states were liberally administering welfare, a plight Clinton countered by fixing the welfare funds for individual states at a constant regardless of their caseloads (Rector Bradley, 2009). With the advent of the 1996 reforms, Clinton mainly displayed concern for those that belonged to the middle to lower class, those that formed a body of people that had the ability to work but not the requisite skill and would thus become the first to lose their jobs in case of a recession (On the Issues, 2010). His policy was designed to instigate pro-work and pro-family sentiments so that the single mother and the single father were better protected but still encouraged to work.
The original AFDCs funding structure was such that although more than 50 of the funds originated at the hands of the federal government, the administration of those funds was controlled by the state themselves who formulated their own policies, restrictions and eligibility criteria. Even though low-income was a deciding factor for welfare compensation encapsulating most of the population of poor children and mothers, the state decided the quota for the monthly benefits. This created 50 different systems of welfare governance, virtually all of which had considerable oversight by the federal government. Clinton proposed to increase the Earned Income Tax Credit by a large amount, from 15.9 to 21.2 billion, a move that went unnoticed by the masses because of the prominent but subtle nature of its benefits. Although it cut taxes for 15 million families, it was a move that went unnoticed by many a member of the media mainly because of the complicated nature of its effects at the time of its advent. The EITC increase was designed to provide the hard working low-income citizens a means of acquiring more disposable income, but there was no way to judge if the hoards of waitresses, janitors and hospital staff that were buttressed actually received the distinct advantages or whether they remained unaffected (On the Issues, 2010).
There was to be a new incentive for responsible fatherhood entitled Fathers WorkFamilies Win which involved an infusion of 225 million to enable those with low wages support themselves and their families, aimed squarely at reducing child poverty. The democratic way involved imparting this aid to business-led local and state workforce investment boards who work in partnership with community and faith-based organizations, and agencies administering child support, TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid thereby connecting low-income fathers and working families to the life-long learning and employment services created under the Workforce Investment Act and delivered through one-stop career centers (On the Issues, 2010). The policy also awarded states for successfully moving the unemployed into jobs as an incentive to ease the transition into work.
At the time the reformation acts were enacted in 1996, there was a wealth of criticisms highlighting its negative effects. Members of the senate complained how it would raise poverty, make life increasingly harsh for the single parent and indulge the unemployed into further misery. Some of the protesting officials resigned as a result. It was a sight too hard for them to bear as an age old program of aid for the poor was coming to an end (Wolf, 2006). Liberals warned how it would result in starvation with the masses of children sleeping on grates (Allen-Mills, 2009).
However, Clinton proved that he knew better. He began these efforts before he became president, as the Governor of Arkansas, which was reflected in the success Arkansas saw in reducing homelessness. The state became a national leader in welfare reformation (Zuckerman, 2000). The effects of the 1996 reforms were much the same on other states as well. In Tennessee, more individuals moved off the welfare programs and into jobs leading to decreased cases of reentry on the rolls (Barbour, Donald, Thacker, 2001).
In 1994, caseloads peaked at 5.1 million only to have gone down steadily as a result of the policy changes (Wolf, 2006). A decade later this number had gone down to 2 million (Allen-Mills, 2009). Millions have departed from their welfare rolls in pursuit of low paying jobs. Another million had been disqualified for not adhering to the rules or had either worn out their time limits rendering them ineligible. The round up was as follows 1.9 million families get cash benefits in one-third of them, only the children qualify for aid. About 38 of those still on welfare are black, 33 white and 24 Hispanic (Wolf, 2006). This figure was a marked improvement from pre 1996 times and goes to prove the critics wrong. However, this success rate cannot all be attributed to revolutionary welfare policies. The economy had fared fairly well during the decade following the advent of the bill and a strong economy is just as much responsible for the success if not more. Some republicans attribute the drop in caseloads solely to the blistering pace at which the economy boomed.
Conclusion
Analyzing the entire set of facts, it may even be suggested that the policy making had reached its peak in 1996 when it came to welfare reforms. It brought a world of positive changes, all evidenced by figures and a drop in welfare bills for the federal government and a consequent drop in taxes. However, in a recession such as the one facing the American economy right now, this much praised system of welfare may be under threat as Obama administrations current stimulus package seeks to infuse a similar AFDC system by injecting 800 billion into the economy. This concerns the tax payers as the federal government would have to bear 80 percent of cost for each new family that a state enrolls in welfare (Rector Bradley, 2009), a rate much higher than the original AFDC system. Giving similar incentives to states to add more families to the welfare system has proved to be flawed in the past although Obama argues it as a necessary move to assist the jobless through difficult times. If history is any testimony, the original policy is far more effective in the long run than Obamas socialist stimulus.
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