Sociology

The variety of approaches to the study and the analysis of knowledge clearly demonstrates that knowledge is an extraordinarily elusive concept.  This is manifest in the debates which center on what has become known as Theory of Knowledge and these debates can be broken down into a number of constituent features pertaining to knowledge.  These constituent features concern such questions as the nature of knowledge, how knowledge once defined is subsequently acquired and known, the limitations attached to perceivable types of knowledge, and how skepticism ought to best be incorporated into the quest for knowledge.  Two of the more well-known approaches to these questions have been broadly referred to as sets of scientific and historical explanations or analytical paradigms.  This paper will engage in a comparative analysis of these historical and scientific explanations as they pertain to a Theory of Knowledge by noting and discussing certain similarities and differences that the respective approaches engender.

As a preliminary matter, before proceeding to a substantive discussion of the historical and scientific explanations with respect to a Theory of Knowledge, it is first necessary to more precisely define what is meant by a Theory of Knowledge.  Generally speaking, it has been noted that Epistemology in the Western philosophical tradition has until recently offered a prominent definition of knowledge that analyzes knowledge into three essential components justification, truth, and belief. According to this analysis, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This tripartite conceptualization of knowledge has been characterized as the propositional theory of knowledge.  Linguistically, in an effort to express this type of theoretical framework exactly, philosophers have employed a declarative type of syntax in which knowledge is declared in the form of a proposition.  It might be stated in this respect, for instance, that certain chemicals cause cancer or that unregulated capitalism causes war.  The propositional nature transcends the underlying type of knowledge to be attained and functions as a sort of overarching expression of justification, truth, and belief.  These features of knowledge, however, are constituent parts of the larger Theory of Knowledge rather than independent types of knowledge.  Belief, for instance, is at the same time viewed as a necessary part of knowledge but one which cannot in and of itself constitute knowledge.  One cannot know that capitalism causes war unless one believes this proposition to be true on the other hand, beliefs may be false, and false beliefs do not constitute knowledge.  One may, in this way, believe that ghosts cause wars and this belief does not rise to the level of knowledge because it lacks truth and justification pursuant to the propositional model.  The truth plus belief calculus is similarly inadequate to constitute actual knowledge because a true belief may be a coincidence specifically, ones belief that Earth is becoming warmer may be true but the truth of this belief may be nothing more than a guess or a coincidence of truth and reality.  This leads, as it related to the articulation of a Theory of Knowledge, to the argument that justification is needed.  It is here, within the realm of justification, that the debate among those advocating scientific explanations and historical explanations diverges most significantly.  The scientific explanations call for a more precise approach to questions involving knowledge and tend to criticize the belief, truth, justification tripartite as requiring a rigorous infusion of scientific methodology and discipline.  Generally speaking, however, both schools of explanations are superficially similar to the extant that they incorporate in certain ways these notions of belief, truth, and some method of justification into their paradigms for constructing a Theory of Knowledge.

The first tension which arises from the historical versus scientific explanation debate is the underlying source of knowledge.  Knowledge is treated by both approaches as being essentially derivative in nature, a similarity between the two, and yet these approaches diverge with respect to where these sources may be derived.  Historical explanations, for example, depend on a much greater variety of sources in pursuit of knowledge that can be alleged and evaluated.  These sources may be immediately observed, as might be true with a primary text such as Joseph Stalins diary, or secondary materials ostensible recording both objective and subjective information pertaining to an event or a phenomenon.  Implicit in historical explanations of knowledge is a distance in time and place that cannot be eliminated.  Karl Marx, in organizing and presenting his critique of capitalism, was compelled to draw on historical examples of class conflicts and revolutions from the past for which he essentially relied on primary and secondary texts in the form of written texts and written accounts.  Such a reliance, in the pursuit of knowledge, raises a number of important questions with respect to the crafting of a Theory of Knowledge.  There are questions of authenticity, reliability, and accuracy.  Knowledge can only be as accurate as the sources and the accuracy of sources is frequently a matter of substantial debate.  It has often been noted, for example, that histories have been written by those that have prevailed in previous conflicts and that as a consequence both primary and secondary sources have been produced in biased ways that have sought to legitimize and glorify the victors in certain ways.  Scientific explanations, on the other hand, seek to create an immediate source through the use of scientific experiments that are close or immediate in both time and in space.  The source is thereby connected in time and in place in ways that minimize problems such as authenticity, reliability, and accuracy.  These two types of explanations therefore differ in terms of the source material that is used in pursuit of a Theory of Knowledge.  These differences are important and must be accounted for in terms of evaluation.

Perhaps the most significant difference between historical explanations and scientific explanations is the simple fact that historical explanations demand an analytical process of induction and deduction in which proffered propositions cannot be replicated with precision.  Scientific explanations vary in emphasis, some restricting themselves to Poppers notion that knowledge can only be attained through falsification whereas other scientific explanations accept the positive confirmation of a tested hypothesis as a basis of knowledge, but all scientific explanations depend on circumstances and variables that can be provided, controlled, and tested in very specific ways.  This testing is important because it provides a factual framework upon which observable phenomenon can be woven into scientific principles or laws that are constructed in such a way as to constitute scientific knowledge.  These scientific findings become a part of the historical record, they are ostensibly authentic, and the assertion is that they are free of bias.  Whether this is true is debatable to be sure, the historical record is full of scientific studies funded by tobacco companies and other politically and commercially interested parties that certainly create conflicts of interest in the pursuit of knowledge nonetheless, the scientific explanations hail this rigorous focus as the truest path to a verifiable Theory of Knowledge.  These tests can be recreated, tested anew, and the idea is that the ability to verify through replication reinforces and legitimizes the knowledge or the law alleged.  Historical explanations, on the other hand, are much more limited in these respects.  The historical explanations are compelled to rely on the use of reason because historical circumstances and variable cannot be recreated and tested for verification with any precision indeed, it would not be particularly desirable to recreate economic depressions or genocides in order to test the precise causes in the real world.    Superficially, this empirical or scientific type of criticism may seem valid.  A closer examination, however, suggests that scientific explanations can aid in the construction of a Theory of Knowledge, but that reason and historical explanations are sometimes necessary in order to ensure the elimination of bias and to attempt to explain events or phenomenon that cannot be tested scientifically.

First, any assertion that scientific explanations are purely objective and therefore always reliable defies the experiences of history.  Many scientific experiments are designed or otherwise interpreted in order to benefit certain political and economic interests.  An evaluative issue arises, as well as scientific verifiability, when scientific studies yield results to the effect that smoking cigarettes is healthy or that a countrys deficit spending is beneficial to the poor in the long run.  Non-scientific explanations can be interjected in ways that highlight and explain how these scientific results arise, why they arise, and how such abuses of the scientific method can be eliminated.  Second, there are issues such as those related to Darwins Theory of Evolution that cannot be tested with any scientific precision but can be evaluated employing historical methods of inquiry

In the final analysis, both historical explanations and scientific explanations possess strengths and weaknesses with respect to the construction of various theories of knowledge.  While perfectly harmonizing these different approaches may be impossible, the wisest course would seem to be an approach that relies on the strengths of both in order to minimize the respective weaknesses of both.  Skepticism would appear to be a virtue and historical narratives inform many types of skepticism as well as scientific replications.  The best that human beings may achieve is the approximation of knowledge given the limitations inherent in the historical explanations and the scientific explanations.