Sociology

The Availability of a Cause
The British administration had a certain bad reputation in the colonies. Although Acts passed by the British parliament such as a Stamp Act were widely seen as exploitative and there were a few mass protests against various avenues of collecting revenue adopted by the British and the quartering of troops in some areas however once the contrary to the popular perception, the major part of the population of the colonies remained neutral throughout the conflict, supporting neither the British and nor the revolutionaries, quietly carrying out their business regardless of what government held sway over them (Grant, 1995).

According to the founding father and second president of the United States John Adams claimed only one-third of the population of the states supported the revolution, one-third remained loyal to the British and the remaining adopted neutrality in the conflict (Sparshott, 2007). Later researchers, however, have estimated that the supporters of the British rule or loyalists formed 15 to 20 percent of the adult white males while the revolutionaries were supported by 40-45 percent of the white population (Grant, 1995).

Even when the war against the British was in full swing the largest part of the population was either lukewarm or opposed to total independence from Britain, in any case they were unwilling to commit themselves to any side and were waiting to see which side became the winner, the defeat of the British at the Battle of Saratoga in 1777, followed by the hopes of French support with the Franco-American alliance brought many of the fence-sitters toward the patriot camp (Sparshott, 2007).

Weakness of the Counter Insurgent
The British had managed to alienate a large section of the colonial elite. One of the biggest causes of this alienation was the Quebec act which denied white colonialists access to the Native American lands of the Ohio valley. Wealthy colonialists, including many of the founding fathers had hoped to drive the Native Americans from the area and make a lot of money by engaging in land speculation (Schofield, 2002).

The British failed to integrate the colonial elite in the administration of the colonies, the colonial elite were classically educated gentlemen whose ideal models of governance came from the city states of ancient Greece (Constant, 1988). These rejected members of the elite class provided the leadership for the American Revolution.

As we have earlier mentioned, the British had lost the support of 40 to 45 of the main population group of the country, early on in the revolution, the patriots proclaimed their loyalty to the King, declaring their opposition only to the Parliament of England and its power to legislate in their matters despite the fact that they were not represented in it, but by the time of Greenes campaign the Declaration of Independence had been signed and there was no national consensus.

British maladministration and lack of foresight can also be seen in the employment of mercenary Hessian troops in the conflict against the patriots. This was one of the major issues that caused the opposition against the British rule and support for the patriots to grow (Grant, 1995).

The resoluteness of the British, in general, can be gauged from the protracted nature of the American Revolution, which spanned around seven years, however Greenes campaign was aimed at sapping their strength and resolve and was ultimately successful at it.

The British forces appear to have had certain knowledge of counter-insurgency measures, this can be seen from their efforts at Americanizing the conflict in the South . General Cornwallis engaged in recruitment of American loyalists, after professional British troops had captured an area, the control of the area would be passed on to local loyalist militias (Dederer, 1983).

Geographic Conditions
The American terrain was also inconductive to the British forces. The British regular army was geared towards battles in which opposing armies would march towards each other in a plain, shooting at one another the army that stayed in the field and forced its opposing side to disperse would be considered the winner. The patriots too usually followed this model of combat which often led to their rout by the superior British forces, however due to the heavily wooded terrain, once the patriots were routed and forced to disperse they could no longer be pursued and killed by the British side (Pohl, 1974).

Nathanael Greene main genius was in exploiting this facet of the terrain. Unlike other generals who were always interested in winning the field, Greene was perfectly content upon giving the enemy a series of punishing losses while incurring a string of defeats (Pohl, 1974).

Outside Support
Outside support for the patriots came from the French, the Spanish and the Dutch. The allies supplied the patriots with ammunition and supplies they also attacked British possessions in other parts of the world which lead to British forces being stretched too thin and lack of troops to resupply the conflict in America (Grant, 1995).

Soundness of Greenes Insurgent Strategy
Greenes realized early on that his forces were incapable of affecting an outright defeat on the British through one decisive battle in the conventional manner. Of his nearly 2500 men, only about 800 were in any shape to fight in a war. In the South there was a network of patriot militias in place. Greene communicated with them and attempted to get them to fight in co-ordination with his army. This strategy worked with militia leaders such as Francis Marion but did not work with others such as Thomas Sumpter (Dederer, 1983).

He split his forces with a smaller mobile force in Brigadier General Morgans command this raised the spirit of the population and kept them from joining the loyalists while at the same time forcing General Cornwallis to split his forces too which enabled the defeat at Cowpens (Dederer, 1983).
Overall Greenes strategy was a sound one and it is not surprising that his Southern Campaign was a strategic success.

Analysis of General Cornwallis Counter-Insurgency Strategy
General Cornwallis strategy for his campaign was essentially a reactive one, his forces were sufficient to rout the patriot militia from any area but unequal to the task of occupying all the towns and cities at once.

Cornwallis  attempted an Americanization of the conflict, recruiting Loyalist militias to maintain British control over an area once the patriot forces had been routed from there, however General Greene put an end to that tactic by massacring recruits on occasion (Dederer, 1983).
By splitting his forces into three, General Cornwallis gave away his main advantage, his refusal to break out from the mold of traditional warfare resulted in great losses for his army and his eventual defeat.

General Morgans Planning and Execution of the Battle of Cowpens in Light of the Nine Principles of War

The first principle of war is concentrating combat power at a decisive time and place, at Cowpens, the whole of General Morgans forces, his cavalry, his militia and his marksmen were all deployed against the enemy (Edwards, 1914).

Surprise is an essential principle of war. General Morgan halted his army at Hannahs Cowpens instead of crossing the Broad river and assuming position at Kings mountain as Tarleton expected him to (Edwards, 1914).

Simplicity of plans is another essential principle of war. General Morgan had clearly defined plans for his army, especially for the minimally trained militia forces. He told them to fire three volleys at the enemy and then marked a place for them to retreat and regroup. He also had clearly defined plans for the cavalry who were to attack Tarletons cavalry and for his marksmen who were to prevent the enemy from reconnaissance and gathering intelligence on their positions (Edwards, 1914).