Sociology

To generations of philosophers and sociologists, the argument on political power has never died. The lines between those who wield power and the subjects have been blurred and sharpened many times over. However, it is widely accepted that to whom political powers rest depends on the socio-political awareness of a given society.

According to Dennis Wrong, there are two ways to attain power or authority - that is, by coercing the subject into complying or by inducement. Coercion can be employed with the use of force upon the subject. However, a coercer may succeed without possessing either the capability or the intention of using force so long as the power subjects believe that he possesses both. In this manner, authority is therefore given to the coercer by the subject as opposed from the coercer enforcing power over the subjects (42-43).

Authority by inducement, on the other hand, is the offering of rewards for compliance rather than threatening deprivations. This characterizes relationships in which one party voluntarily submits to the others commands for economic rewards. Considering that the subject has nothing to offer but his labor, this relationship easily turns into economic exploitation that can be tantamount to threatening of deprivation of economic stability. (Wrong 43)

Authority can also be attained by having specialized knowledge over others in a given society. This is exemplified by the physician-patient relationship where the doctor has the power on what treatment course can be made and the patient abides by the regimen with trust to the superior knowledge of the physician on medical matters. Further, a professional who possesses power based on knowledge also possesses some of the attributes of power based on legally ratified status, and this status depends on the power of the collective organization of his fellow experts (Wrong 53-55).

Webers classification of authority presents to be more coherent. He states that domination or authority can be of the three types which are the traditional, the charismatic and the rational. Rational authority is attained by election or appointment of a person to carry out the rule of law. This implies that the ruler himself must follow these rules and the subjects do not owe obedience to the ruler but to the rule of law (Weber 2 215). This model typically applies to democracies. Ideally, the ruler is selected according to his competence to apply the rule of law. In this model, bureaucracy is a mere demonstration of graduation in levels of competence and therefore of authority. In this model, the ruler or rulers have a tendency to plutocracy as each gains experience and therefore more competence relative to the others (Weber 2 220-221).

Traditional authority, as the name implies, is power inherited by tradition - from ancestors or the immediate counterparts thereof. In this type of authority, both power and authority are held by the ruler unless he elects to have a staff to which he endows authority. However, this staff is still answerable to the ruler and therefore has power only for so long as the ruler admits. As such, traditional authority can resort to monopolistic wants for the self-satisfaction of the ruler (Weber 2 238). In an estate-type of traditional domination, the division of powers corresponds to the compromise to the ruler of organized groups of persons, appropriated by seigniorial powers.

Charismatic authority is characterized as a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities (Weber 1 241). This type of domination requires that the subjects acknowledge the authority of the ruler. The charismatic staff and their corresponding authorities therefore selected by virtue.

Ralf Dahrendorf used conflict groups to represent classes in a manner that they represent a common socio-political stance regardless of social strata. According Dahrendorf, the power or authority generally resides in a minority (195).  This can be easily seen even in todays societies. In almost all occasions, only a few people wield the power that commands a rather vast majority. On the other hand, Dahrendorf required qualification of this theory for industrial societies at an advanced stage of development where 13 of all employees exercise super-ordinate function. Therefore, legitimate power may be distributed, if with considerable gradations of spheres of authority, over a large number of positions and there can be as many competing, conflicting or coexisting conflict groups in a society as there are associations (195-198). Class in this theory was defined as conflict groups that are generated by the differential distribution of authority in imperatively coordinated associations (204). This theory can be observed in a political structure with only one department but it still notably neglects the subjectivity of power in that gradation.

Taking on more recent administrative systems, we often see an overlapping scope of jurisdiction wherein an official of a specific department has authority over the others where he has jurisdiction (Weber 1 947). This is with regards to a direct democratic administration wherein the authority is elected by the society which includes the officials themselves. This is the ideal model presented by Max Weber. In a more realistic scale, this administration will tend to turn into the rule by notables as those in authority strive to keep the vested authority. Further, these notables tend to identify with others creating political parties representing common ends. Democratic administration therefore becomes a matter of struggle between political parties (1 950-951).

With regards to todays governments, Mills offers an unsettling yet observably accurate thesis on distribution and use of power. Mills asserts that both power and authority is distributed in the power elites. The power elite is composed of political, economic and military men, Mills states, this instituted elite is frequently in tension it comes together only on certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions of crisis (276).

Whichever of the three types seem to lead at any given period of time depends on the tasks of the period as they, the elites themselves, define them (Mills 277). This view of shuffling power distribution is consonant to that of Webers rational authority when put to the extremes. Mills further adds that Men from high places may be ideological representatives of the poor and humble and among the politicians, there are sympathetic agents of given groups, conscious and unconscious, paid or unpaid (280). He specified that the power elite can come from humble origins although, generally, they come from higher places. Either way, even an elite coming from humble origins may opt to represent the interests of those in the higher strata. Furthermore, the types of power elite can intermingle and even change. The inner core of the power elite consists, first, of those who interchange commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order to that of another the admiral who is also a banker and a lawyer and who heads up an important federal commission, et cetera (Mills 288).

The power elite also prefers to use existing organizations, working within and between them than set up explicit organizations whose membership is exclusive to its own members. This increases the power elite representation and authority. The power elite will also make ways to ensure balanced decisions in the types represented (Mills 293). In this design, the power elite earn power and authority and uses it to retain the same for as much and as long as the power elite can. This pushes the aggressive power elite to the top, amassing more power, while those in the middle settle in a stalemate all this almost without regard of the subjects.

In a nutshell, Mills referred to the power elite self-serving yet independent, critical decision-makers
The elite cannot be truly thought of as men who are merely doing their duty. They are the ones who determine their duty as well as the duties of those beneath them. They are not merely following orders They give orders. They are not merely bureaucrats, they command bureaucracies. They may try to disguise themselves by these facts from others or from themselves by appeals to traditions of which they imagine themselves the instruments, but there are many traditions, and they must choose which ones they will serve. (286)