Sociology

Although intelligence operations had been assembled to deal with specific challenges throughout Americas early history, it was not until the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 that a true intelligence community was truly incorporated into Americas institutional framework.  How this intelligence community would be composed, and precisely what functions it would serve, generated a fierce amount of debate.  This debate was particularly important given the fact that America was, with the conclusion of the Second World War, demobilizing certain intelligence units and operations while simultaneously being faced with the onset of the Cold War and soon-to-be encountered conflicts with a newly Communist China, Korea, and Cuba.  This paper will examine some of the main arguments and motivations in favor of and against the creation of a truly institutionalized intelligence community and the implications that the decision in favor of a true intelligence community had with respect to the early days of the Cold War.

The main debate which arose was stimulated by William J. Donovans proposal, made to then president Franklin D. Roosevelt, to create a formal intelligence agency.  This new intelligence agency, in his view, would be vested with the authority to collect intelligence overtly and covertly and to also coordinate intelligence operations on behalf of the federal government.  The arguments in favor of the creation of a true intelligence community were motivated by the fact that The air was full of news of the investigation of Pearl Harbor, the abolition of OSS, the establishment of the NIA and CIG, the discovery of Soviet spying in Canada, and ominous developments in the Cold War. In that atmosphere certain ideas on intelligence became commonplace.

There were four main arguments in favor of the creation of a formal intelligence framework and community.  First, it was argued that threats to American security remained in relatively peaceful times as much as during war.  Pearl Harbor was used to illustrate this type of argument.  Second, because previous intelligence efforts and organizational forms had tended to have been in reaction to specific threats, it was argued that an effective intelligence community required a much more effective organization and more support than the armed services and the country as a whole had ever provided in the past.

This would pose something of a threat to both the branches of the military and the FBI.  Third, it was argued that a true intelligence community, collectors and analysts, was needed if raw intelligence was to be properly analyzed and provided to government departments in need of that intelligence.  Finally, in an increasingly competitive world, it was argued that espionage was necessary in order to avoid nasty surprises and to safeguard national security.

There were many objections to whether a true intelligence community ought to be institutionalized and, if so, what form it ought to take.  Indeed, it has been noted that the NSC system, JCS, and CIA were not created with the national interest in mind. Established by the National Security Act of 1947, these agencies were creatures of conflict and compromise. They arose from one of the most bitter bureaucratic battles in American history.

It is the bureaucratic type of objection that led to many stalemates in the beginning.  Many branches of the military wanted to preserve their intelligence independence and objected to an intelligence agency that might usurp their authority in certain ways.  Other critics argued that the OSS, under William J. Donovans leadership, had been well-suited to the uncertainties of war but that this type of unregulated intelligence paradigm was simply unsuitable to peacetime.  Harry Truman considered both sides of the debate and attempted to create an overt intelligence organization, one which would emphasize the gathering and analysis of information rather than secret operations.

As some of the critics had predicted, however, Truman was ultimately unable to control covert activities and to some extant the true intelligence community that developed was significantly different from the one that he envisioned more narrowly.

Some of the fears also turned out to be prescient with respect to the new intelligence community and its effectiveness in the early stages of the Cold War.  Intelligence was still hampered by competition between and among different intelligence authorities.  One commentator, summarizing what seems to be a fairly common assessment in the academic literature, argues that During the Cold War, when it counted most, the Joint Chiefs and the CIA fell shortriven by parochial service interests.

These parochial service interests would give rise to conflicting priorities and conflicting approaches to Cold War problems.  With respect to Cuba, for instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff geared their intelligence operations in order to justify an all-out invasion of Castros Cuba whereas the CIA calibrated its intelligence to justify what turned out to be its disastrous Bay of Pigs operation.  While it would be too much to suggest that the creation of the true intelligence community was a mistake, for it most certainly would give rise to the collection of much valuable information, it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the intelligence community that did develop was inadequately integrated and that the persistence of parochial service interests hindered rather than aided intelligence efforts during the Cold War.