Sociology

Science, both as a body of knowledge regarding phenomena in general and as an enterprise is usually characterized as essentially value-free. By being value-free, science stands as an objective enterprise that it is free from prejudices which stem from differing ideological, political and even theoretical perspectives. Elucidating further, one may claim that the scientific enterprise, as it claims to be objective in its study of phenomena via the scientists rigorous employment of the scientific method, is essentially descriptive and not normative. Such is the case since it merely describes how things are in the universe and how a certain phenomenon occurs. As a result of this, it does not prescribe how things in the universe ought to be or how a certain phenomenon ought to proceed. Such a conception of science however fails to account for the role of scientific communities in the creation and validation of scientific beliefs. By placing emphasis on the role of objectivity within scientific disciplines, individuals outside the discipline are deluded by the distinction made in scientific discourse between subjectivity and objectivity.

In line with this, the following discussion focuses on showing how scientific discourse manages to formulate a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity on the grounds of facticity partially determined by intersubjectivity as well as historicity. Such adherence to intersubjectivity in relation to setting the standards for determining objectivity in the formation of scientific knowledge works within a realist framework about the external world hence knowledge is depicted as the discovery of reality instead of the creation of the human mind. By emphasizing the role of the human mind in the creation of facts in scientific discourse, one may provide an enlightened view of scientific discourse which introduces the active role of human agents in the creation of scientific facts.

For the sake of clarity, the following discussion forwards the claim that in order to fully understand the machinations behind the creation of scientific facts, it is necessary to consider the role of human agents in the construction of scientific facts. This claim is based on several assumptions. First, science is a social construct (Kuhn, 1962 Fagan, 2009). Second, the social construction of science is evident in the role of criticisms in the legitimization of scientific discourse (Lewin, 2005). Finally, the social construction of science is evident in the differences between the construction of scientific discourses in developed and developing countries (Anderson  Buck, 1980).

Science as a Social Construct
The association of science with objectivity is traceable to the emphasis on the importance of truth in relation to the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the discipline. It is important to note that it is generally recognized that the acceptability of a system of thought is dependent on the acceptability of its premises. Acceptability carries a time co-efficient due to the recognition of the corrigibility and tentativeness of empirical propositions. This is especially evident in systems working within a scientific framework. Consider for example the importance ascribed by logical positivists in the empirical verifiability of a terms referent. Logical positivists during the initial period of the 20th century suggested that words without referents are cognitively meaningless hence metaphysical statements along with ethical and aesthetic statements are considered as pseudo-propositions since they merely express emotional attitudes rather than statements of facts (Ayer, 1952). The importance ascribed towards the empirical character of knowledge is further evident in the promotion of falsifiability as a means of distinguishing scientific from non-scientific disciplines. Popper (2002) argues that given that theories are testable yet neither justifiable nor verifiable, it follows that the objectivity of these theories stem from the intersubjectivity of the tests for these theories. This intersubjectivity of tests for scientific claims further leads to scientific claims dependence on derivability relations as opposed to truth conditions (Popper, 2002). Within such a scheme, objective truth merely serves as a regulative ideal for science. Scientific theories are thereby seen as depicting the most approximate account of reality. This is possible due to the continuous integration of knowledge derived from accumulated experience into the scientific worldview.

Given that the accumulation of integrated knowledge that enables the creation of a scientific worldview is affected by those who integrate this worldview, it follows that the human mind also affects the creation and maintenance of this worldview. The effect of the human mind however may not be simply regulated to mans discovery of scientific truths as it also includes mans construction of the criteria and the setting for creating and understanding these truths. Fagan (2009) notes this in her discussion of Flecks epistemological framework. Fleck (as cited in Fagan, 2009) perceives epistemology as an interactive process which is inherently social in character. Fleck perceives epistemology as a social process since the formation of knowledge involves the communication and hence interaction of human agents who generate thought-styles that are collectively arranged within a particular mode of inquiry (as cited in Fagan, 2009). In the case of science, this is apparent as scientific knowledge is created through scientists creation of a scientific language that they legitimize through its continuous use within the discipline. In the case of delegitimizing a particular scientific framework, the same process is also used as scientists create and then adapt a different language for conceptualizing scientific phenomena.

Kuhn (1962) discusses the evolution of scientific thought is affected by these processes of legitimization and de-legitimization of a scientific framework. Within the text Kuhn (1962) extrapolates on the very nature and necessity of what he calls scientific revolutions. He sees an apparent parallelism between political revolutions and scientific revolutions as he defines to such revolutions as those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one (Kuhn, 1962, p.91). On a preliminary note, paradigms are frameworks in and through which we approach phenomena in general. They are models so to speak. Naturally enough, different models employ different methodologies. Different methodologies in turn generate different types of knowledge which consequently have different criteria of proof or validity. As Kuhn (1962) contends, scientific developments may appropriately be characterized by paradigm shifts which he refers to as scientific revolutions.

It is important to note that scientific developments do not occur in a vacuum. For the aforementioned reason, there is a felt need to situate scientific developments in the historical context within which they are conceived, proposed and ultimately, institutionalized and integrated as part of societys shared knowledge. This is to say that scientific revolutions are also proper objects of historical analysis and discourse in as much as political revolutions. The scientific enterprise and its history is not as orderly and neat as what we have been led to believe in the formative years of our education in the schools and the academe. This is to say that our academic institutions offer us an incomplete view of science. Such is the case since it does not introduce us to the incompatibility and irreconcilability of past and present scientific paradigms. For Kuhn, the social construction of scientific facts is evident as social conditions dictate the adherence from one scientific paradigm to another. This is further evident if one considers the relationship between scientific and political developments.

Although there are significant differences in both scientific and political developments, Kuhn argues that one may be justified in using the notion of revolution as a metaphor for understanding them. Kuhns parallelism is founded on the idea that in both cases, a sense of malfunction, in our institutions as for the case of the political and in our paradigms as for the case of the scientific, necessitates for the occurrence of a revolution. After the occurrence of such revolutions, the reliability of a scientific claim is based on its acceptability within the scientific community. As Cotgrove (1970) argues, this merely shows that the maintenance of the scientific disciplines is dependent on the social system created by those who participate within the discipline.
The Manifestations of the Social Construction of Science

Given that science stands as a discipline dependent on social negotiations, as can be seen on the dependence of scientific facts on communal consensus, one may perceive science as a discipline similar to other social disciplines. Castel  Sismondo (2002), in their discussion of the discipline, conceive of science as a social art. They argue that to perceive science as a social art allows the conception of science that is dependent on the epistemological and ontological beliefs valued by its participants (Castel  Sismondo, 2002).  In addition to this, they also argue that by perceiving science as a social art, it is possible to retain a certain form of sciences objectivity (Castel  Sismondo, 2002). Such objectivity however is not derived from the association of raw truths to scientific facts but rather on the association of communally agreed upon truths to scientific facts (Castel  Sismondo, 2002).

An example of this method of validation in science is presented by Lewin (2005) in her discussion of the role of criticism in scientific validation. In her analysis of thirty comments from two major journals in sociology, Lewin argues that the validation and criticism of sociological claims is one of the major factors in strengthening the position of a particular theory in the social sciences. Lewin further argues that this may be understood as a way of warding off competition (2005, p.740). She argues that scientists provide criticisms of other scientists theories in order to maintain the established dominance of their theory in the scientific community (Lewin, 2005). Her study provides support for Castel  Sismondos argument as it shows how the social mechanics within the field of science affect the validation of scientific claims.

Another example of this is evident in Anderson and Bucks (1980) analysis of the differences between the scientific validation in both developed and underdeveloped countries. As opposed to assessing the methods of scientific validation in both types of countries, Anderson and Buck (1980) address the correlation of science with development. They argue that the differences in the conception of science in the developed and underdeveloped countries may be traced to the differences of the ideological beliefs of both types of countries (Anderson  Buck, 1980). Differences in ideology reflect in a peoples conception of science as it may either lead to a universalizable conception of science or one that is limited to a particular arena. In the case of industrialized countries, both authors note the tendency for such countries to equate science with development (Anderson  Buck, 1980). As opposed to this, developing countries tend to conceive science within a highly formalistic framework. Such a discrepancy may be traced to the formers association of the process of development with scientific and technological development as opposed to the latters conception of the discipline as a purely formalistic and hence academic topic. These different conceptions of science within both types of countries may be attributed to the role of social beliefs and social conditions in understanding the function of science in society. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, environmental factors affect the conception of science in society. This is evident in the existence of different social conditions that foster scientific development. An example of this is evident in the case of dictatorial regimes wherein the results of scientific development are rarely used to further the economic capabilities of the people. As opposed to this, a democratic regime allows the public utilization of the different developments in science and technology which may increase the developmental capabilities of its people.

As can be seen from the examples mentioned above, the social construction of science is not merely evident in the scientific communitys dependence on communal consensus in the creation of scientific facts. The social construction of science is also evident in the effects of social and political conditions in how a society understands and perceives the discipline of science. To a certain extent, one may state, that it is advisable for science to adopt this weak form of objectivity resulting from the socially constructed nature of the discipline. Such is the case since doing so enables the unification of science with other aspects of society. In other words, it enables science to be freed from the alienating barriers of objectivity and truth which it has relegated upon itself. In addition to this, accepting this weak form of objectivity would allow scientists to face the role of verification and truth in the formulation of scientific facts.